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IIL SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant, Edward F. Lovato ("Mr. Lovato") herein replies to the argument,
assertions and legal analysis as constituted in the Brief of the Appellee prepared by the
Appellee, Petra Lovato ("Ms. Lovato"). This appeal was taken in connection with the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court after hearing and trial.
To review and in brief, Mr. Lovato argues that the Court erred when it ruled (1) Mr. Lovato
pay Ms. Lovato alimony and that this alimony be offset by child support received from Ms.
Lovato, (2) Mr. Lovato pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees, (3) Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital
home bear interest and (4) the insurance proceeds from a house fire was a marital asset. This,
in practicable terms, resulted in the following: Mr. Lovato was awarded the parties' minor
children without child support1, responsibility and upkeep of the marital residence without
an equity interest,2 re-build the marital home after a fire with Vi of the insurance proceeds
necessary to re-build and pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees. The resultant inequity is unfair
and unjust.

1

Mr. Lovato was awarded physical custody of the parties' minor children; namely
Christopher and Alexander. See Record, page 395.
2

The trial court ruled that Ms. Lovato's interest in the marital residence bear an interest
rate of 6.513%
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IV, ARGUMENT
A. REPLY TO MS. LOVATO'S ASSERTION THAT MR. LOVATO SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM ATTEMPTING TO RE-LITIGATE THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Ms. Lovato argues that Mr. Lovato he should be estopped from arguing the merits of
his case. She cites the Higley court in stating that "[i]t is well settled that this Court will not
disturb the trial courts distribution of property and award of alimony in a divorce proceeding
unless a clear and convincing prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown."3 It is clear that the
trial court in this case abused its discretion. The practicable application of the ruling made
by the trial court resulted in an unfair distribution of property and assistance for child care.
It awarded Mr. Lovato the marital residence without an equity interest. It siwarded Ms.
Lovato of insurance proceeds that were ear-marked to re-build the marital home that she
already had an equity interest in. The result was a double equity position. Not only was she
awarded the value of the house, she was also awarded Vi of the insurance proceeds that were
to be applied to refurbish the home after a fire and sustaining Mr. Lovato while re-building.
Further, it awarded interest in the marital residence the result of which will exhaust any
potential equity position for Mr. Lovato. It also awarded Ms. Lovato attorney fees when she

3

See Appellee's Brief, page 19, see also Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah
1983), quoting Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982).
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was as capable of earning a living as Mr. Lovato. It is a clear prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Further, it is grossly unfair and unjust.
Ms. Lovato argues that this court should reject the trial court's brief in its entirety.4
She suggests that to disagree with the court's ruling is somehow disingenuous and in bad
faith.

The trial court abused its discretion when in surmising the evidence, it made

inequitable and unfair conclusions of law based on findings. The brief of the appellant clear
and unequivocally details the unfair and unjust conclusions ordered by the trial court.
Ms. Lovato correctly asserts the trial court ruled that Mr. Lovato had the ability to
increase his wages and at the same time, reduce his expenses.5 As discussed in Appellant's
Brief this finding is without basis. If you consider that in neutralizing Mr. Lovato's financial
support from Ms. Lovato, the trial court essentially forced Mr. Lovato to take a second job
to meet the needs of himself and his children, while at the same time, deducting his
expenses. To reiterate, the court refused to take into consideration Fletcher v. Fletcher,6
where the Supreme Court of the state of Utah held that it is allowable to take into
consideration limits in earnings of the spouse when that spouse has custody of the parties'

4

See Appellee's Brief, page 22.

5

Id., page 23.

6

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980).
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minor children, 7 The trial court failed to follow this case in considering earnings and
earning capacity of Mr. Lovato.
The consequence of not following Fletcher are far reaching. The couple's two sons
are teenagers. Mr. Lovato was awarded primary custody of the parties' two sons. The
children live with Mr. Lovato in the marital residence. 8 The trial court's ruling retarded Mr.
Lovato's ability raise their teenage boys by forcing Mr. Lovato to discount his expenses and
raise his monthly income, and by de facto, ordered Mr. Lovato to obtain additional
employment. The appellant has a legal right and an equitable right to appeal this grossly
unfair and impracticable ruling by the trial court.
B.
REPLY TO MS, LOVATO'S ASSERTION THAT MR, LOVATO IS
ATTEMPTING TO DISPUTE THE EVIDENCE ITSELF AT THE APPELLATE
LEVEL
Ms. Lovato also argues that Mr. Lovato in his Appellant Brief 'Tailed to rebut the
presumption that he had the ability to pay alimony.ff9 This court has before it the evidence,
presented not only in the Appellant's Brief regarding alimony, but also the trial record. It is
7

See Appellee's Brief, page 26.

8

With the award of interest and the lien awarded to Ms. Lovato, Mr. Lovato is left with
the upkeep of the residence, the monthly mortgage payments, and other expenses to maintain the
home at a minium standard without any realistic possibility of obtaining an equity position of the
property. See Brief of the Appellant, page 31.
9

See Appellee's Brief, page 23.
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clear that the evidence as presented at trial and the findings as prepared by Ms. Lovato
demonstrate that trial court failed to take into consideration relevant factors at the expense
of Mr. Lovato. Especially as Mr. Lovato was and is the primary care giver for the couple's
two sons.
Ms. Lovato mis-characterizes Higley.10 Ms. Lovato compares the ruling in Higley to
support the proposition that an alimony award in this case is similar to the facts in Higley,
and therefore an alimony award is warranted.11 There are two important factors that
distinguish Higley from this case. First, in Higley , the alimony recipient, the wife, did not
work outside the home. She instead chose to dedicate her self to being a homemaker, raising
the couples' five children. This enabled her husband to work in his welding business.12 In
this case, Ms. Lovato chose to work outside the home. She has been involved in the craft and
housecleaning businesses for many years.13 She has had and still has the ability to make a
substantial living for one living on her own. In essence, Ms. Higley; no reasonable chance
to make a comfortable living without career training, Ms. Lovato; a history of making a

10

See Appellee's Brief, page 25.

11

Id., page 26.

12

Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1983).

13

See Appellee's Brief, page 26.
Page -5-

substantial living and significant potential to increase earning capacity. Second, in Higley,
the parties "children were raised and earning capacity of the non-recipient spouse was not an
issue."

14

In this case, the children are not raised, are in the physical custody of the

non-recipient spouse, and earning capacity is an issue. Ms. Higley's alimony award may have
been warranted due to her dedication and focus on her family which resulted in a diminished
capacity to obtain significant earning potential outside the home. In this case, both parents
worked outside the home during the marriage, both developed the capacity to obtain
significant earning potential and both supported each other in developing each otherfs career.
In this case, Higley, is not relevant.
C. REPLY TO MS. LOVATO'S ASSERTION THAT MR. LOVATO'S OFFSET OF
ALIMONY IS FATALLY FLAWED.
Ms. Lovato asserts that the offset of alimony for child support is fatally Hawed.15 She
argues that the trial court found that Mr. Lovato had the ability to both increase his income
and reduce his expenses.16 Mr. Lovato objects to this finding as constituted in the Brief of
the Appellant.17

To reiterate, Fletcher applies.

The trial court failed to take into

14

Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1983).

15

See Appellee's Brief, page 27.

16

Id., page 27.

17

See Brief of the Appellant, page 26.
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consideration that Mr. Lovato was the custodial spouse in determining limits on earnings
capacity.
Further, Ms. Lovato's argument that the offsets in this case should be sustained does
not take into consideration that child support is the right of the children, not the right of the
parent. "A child's right to support is his own right, not his parents."18 By coupling alimony
and child support by offset, the children become the guarantors of the alimony award.19 The
continued application of offsets between alimony and child support should be discontinued
by law as against public policy. Perhaps convenient for the trier of fact, but not a policy to
continued for mere expediency.

D. REPLY TO MS, LOVATO'S ASSERTION THAT MR, LOVATO
UNREASONABLY ARGUES THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
ORDERED HIM TO PAY ATTORNEY FEES
Ms. Lovato's assertion that Mr. Lovato unreasonably argues that the trial court should
not have ordered him to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney fees is without merit. Mr. Lovato does
not dispute that the trial court has the ability to award attorney fees. However, given the facts
in the case, specifically noted in the findings prepared by Ms. Lovato, it is simply
unreasonable and unsupported by law that Mr. Lovato be 'strapped' with Ms. Lovato's

18

Hill v. Hill, 638 P.2d 876, 877 (Utah 1981).

19

See Brief of the Appellant, page 26.
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attorneys' fees. As stated in the Brief of the Appellant, Shinkoskey20 clearly outlines when
one party should be held to pay his opponent's attorney fees. See Appellant's Brief for
specific arguments, page 26- 29.
E. REPLY TO MS. LOVATO'S ASSERTION THAT INTEREST IN THE MARITAL
HOME WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE
Ms. Lovato asserts that trial court made a sound and just decision when it allowed
interest in favor of Ms. Lovato at the rate of 6.513%.21 This constitutes error. Awarding
interest in favor of Ms. Lovato simply gave Ms. Lovato an equity interest in the home at the
expense of Mr. Lovato. With the award of interest and the lien awarded to Ms. Lovato, Mr.
Lovato is left with the upkeep of the residence, the monthly mortgage payments, and other
expenses to maintain the home at a minium standard without any realistic possibility of
obtaining an equity position of the property.22 In essence, Mr. Lovato is allowed to live in
the home, pay taxes, upkeep, pay off the mortgage for the benefit of Ms. Lovato. The
interest award was clearly an abuse of discretion.

20

Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 Wl 135308, 1,3 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 415 Utah Adv.
Rep. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
21

See Appellee's Brief, pages 35-38.

22

See table on page 31 of Appellant's Brief.
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F. REPLY TO MS, LOVATO'S ASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULING THAT FIRE PROCEEDS WERE A MARITAL ASSET WAS FAIR AND
EQUITABLE
The trial court awarded Vi of the insurance proceeds as a result of the fire on the
marital residence after the parties separated. Ms. Lovato argues that the trial court's award
of these proceeds was fair and reasonable. However, awarding such an interest only
compounds the an unfair and unreasonable ruling by the trial court. Mr. Lovato collected
$17,404.58 in insurance proceeds. He used some of the money for living expenses while he
was living in the home and attempting to re-build. It must be noted that the couple's children
were living in the home with Mr. Lovato while he was re-building and the expenses were
necessary for the upkeep and living while the house was under construction. Despite this,
the court ruled that lA of those proceeds were the right of Ms. Lovato. Ms. Lovato essentially
received a windfall of $7,500.00.23
V, CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and more specifically in the Appellant's Brief, this Court
should reverse the trial court's decision and, (1) eliminate the award of alimony, (2) eliminate
the award of attorney fees, (3) eliminate the award of insurance proceeds to Ms. Lovato, and
(4) eliminate the interest award on the marital lien on the marital residence.
23

See Brief of Appellant, page 32.
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Dated this 15th day of September, 2001.
APV?
BARKER LAW OFFICE
Ronald C. Barker
Thomas E. Stamos

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Monica Z. Kelley, Esq.
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